Mass Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products by Loginova, Oksana - University of Missouri & Wang, X. Henry - University of Missouri
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org
 
 
 
Working Paper #08-33 
 
September 2008 
 
Mass Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products 
 
Oksana Loginova and X. Henry Wang 
 
University of Missouri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
Mass Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products∗
Oksana Loginova† X. Henry Wang‡
September 3, 2008
Abstract
We analyze a duopoly game in which products are initially differentiated in variety and quality.
Each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality valuation. Customization provides
ideal varieties but has no effect on product qualities. The firms first choose whether to customize
their products, then engage in price competition. We show that in equilibrium either both firms
customize, only the higher quality firm customizes, or no firm customizes. Even if customization
is costless, the firms might not customize. This happens when the quality difference between the
firms is small. We explore how the total welfare changes with the fixed cost of customization.
Interestingly, the relationship is not always monotonic. Contrasting with the situation when
customization is not feasible, both consumer surplus and total welfare are higher when one or
both firms customize.
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1 Introduction
Mass customization is the capability to produce individually tailored products and services on a large
scale with near mass production efficiency. Advances in Internet-based information technologies
and improvements in manufacturing flexibility have made mass customization a reality in many
product categories. For example, National Bicycle Industrial Company custom manufactures high-
end bicycles; Dell custom builds notebook and desktop computers with thousands of combinations
of features possible; NikeID.com allows consumers to create their most preferred athletic pair of
shoes by choosing among many different options for base color, accent color, lace color, etc.
Considerable attention has been paid to mass customization in operations management and
information systems studies. However, only a few works have analyzed customization theoretically
(e.g., Dewan et al. 2003, Syam et al. 2005, Syam and Kumar 2006, Bernhardt et al. 2007,
Alptekinog˘lu and Corbett 2008, and Alexandrov 2008). Most of the existing literature adopt one-
dimensional horizontal differentiation settings of Salop (1979) or Hotelling (1929). Customization
enables consumers to get their ideal products represented by their locations in the product attribute
space. Firms are symmetrical and make symmetric choices in equilibrium.1 Even though many
important aspects of customization are captured by these studies, important issues have yet to be
examined. Casual empiricism indicates that rival firms do not always make the same customization
choices (some customize, some do not) and that higher quality/priced firms are more likely to offer
customization. The goal of our paper is to incorporate these observations into product customization
competition.
We adopt the basic model from the literature that combines horizontal and vertical differentiation
(e.g., Economides 1989, Neven and Thisse 1990). Products have two attributes – variety and quality.
Each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality valuation. On the supply side, there are
two firms that initially produce single products located at the end points of the variety space. The
firms are asymmetrical due to having different qualities. Customization provides ideal varieties for
consumers but has no effect on product qualities. The firms play a sequential two-stage game. In
the first stage, they simultaneously decide whether to customize their products. In the second stage,
they simultaneously choose prices.
The paper closest to ours is Syam et al. (2005). In both papers the consumer space is two-
dimensional. Syam et al. (2005) endow products with two horizontal attributes, for which consumers
have heterogeneous but independent preferences. The firms are initially maximally differentiated
with respect to both attributes. Like in our model, the firms play a two-stage game. They first
choose whether to customize both, one, or none of the attributes, then compete in prices. The key
difference between the two papers is that Syam et al. (2005) work with symmetric firms and focus
on how the possibility of customizing multiple attributes affect customization choices, whereas we
work with asymmetric firms and focus on the role of quality in the firms’ customization decisions.
Another closely related paper is Bernhardt et al. (2007), in which ex ante symmetrical firms
1Exceptions are Bernhardt et al. (2007) and Syam and Kumar (2006). In both asymmetric equilibrium can arise.
However, such equilibrium always appears in pairs. In contrast, the asymmetric equilibrium is unique in our paper.
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acquire different information about consumers and make different customization choices. Similar
to our paper, consumer preferences are two-dimensional, corresponding to two attributes of the
product, and the second attribute – brand loyalty – cannot be customized. There are two main
differences between Bernhardt et al. (2007) and our study. First, Bernhardt et al. (2007) emphasize
the cost side of customization, whereas we focus on the strategic effects of customization. Second,
brand loyalty is a horizontal attribute, not vertical as quality in our paper is.
Several other papers have studied customization using a one-dimensional consumer space. Dewan
et al. (2003) provide a deliberate treatment of customization technology and allow for second-degree
price discrimination. Syam and Kumar (2006) highlight the role of standard products in customiza-
tion competition. Alexandrov (2008) extends Salop’s model in which firms can offer interval-long
adjustable “fat” products.2
Our paper as well as Syam et al. (2005) model customization as zero-one decisions, so that
all customers of a customizing firm get their most preferred products. In contrast, all the other
papers mentioned above treat customization as continuous choices. Both approaches match aspects
of reality and have their advantages. With zero-one decisions, more attention can be devoted to the
strategic effects of customization. With continuous customization choices, one can focus more on
how efficiency considerations determine the range of customization.
Our equilibrium analysis shows that either both firms customize, only the high quality firm
customizes, or no firm customizes. The appearance of this sequence of outcomes is monotone in the
fixed cost of customization. The key to this result is that the high quality firm always gains more
from customization than the low quality firm. As a result, both firms customize when the cost of
customization is small, only the high quality firm customizes for intermediate levels of customization
cost, and neither firm customizes when the cost is high.
We show that even if customization is costless, each of the three equilibria mentioned above
is possible. In particular, both firms choose not to customize when the difference between the
firms’ quality levels is small, only the high quality firm customizes for moderate quality differences,
and both firms customize when the quality difference is large. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. Customization by one or both firms makes the rivals “closer” to each other, thus intensifying
price competition. The smaller is the quality difference, the tougher is price competition. In the
extreme case in which the quality difference is zero and both firms customize, price competition
results in the Bertrand outcome. Therefore, when the quality difference is small, the firms do not
customize their products in order to avoid a price war. When the quality difference is large, the
firms customize to take advantage of consumers’ desires for ideal varieties. The intermediate case
involves customization by the high quality firm only.
We also explore how total welfare changes with the fixed cost of customization. In general, total
welfare decreases with the customization cost. However, this relationship may be reversed when
the equilibrium switches from customization by both firms to customization by the high quality
2MacCarthy et al. (2003) reviews six categories of mass customization: core customization, post-product customiza-
tion, mass retail customization, self-customizing products, and high variety push. Fat products can be classified as
either self-customizing or high variety push products.
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firm only. This is largely due to the savings by the low quality firm from not undertaking costly
customization.
Furthermore, we contrast our model with the benchmark model in which customization is not
feasible. Both consumer surplus and total welfare are higher when customization is undertaken.
However, the firms may find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma situation and end up worse off
under customization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we setup the model. In Section
3 the pricing stage of the game is analyzed. In Section 4 we study the firms’ customization choices
and investigate how these choices and total welfare are affected by the cost of customization and
quality difference. In Section 5 we contrast our model with the benchmark model and examine the
effects of customization on consumers, firms, and total welfare. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 6. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
Consider an industry in which products are defined along two characteristics, variety and quality.
The former corresponds to horizontal differentiation and the latter to vertical differentiation. Con-
sumer preferences vary along two dimensions. Each consumer has most preferred variety x ∈ [0, 1]
and quality valuation y ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer of type (x, y) derives the following utility from buying
one unit of product i:
v + yqi − t|x− xi| − pi,
where v is a positive constant, t is a preference parameter, qi is the quality, xi is the variety, and pi
is the price of product i. We will assume that v is large enough for all consumers to find a product
that yields positive payoff in equilibrium. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit square
[0, 1]× [0, 1] with a total mass equal to 1.
There are two firms, A and B, operating with zero marginal costs of production. Initially, firm
A offers a single (standard) product of quality qA = 0 and variety xA = 0, whereas firm B offers a
single product of quality qB = q > 0 and variety xB = 1. That is, firm B is the higher quality firm
and the two firms have maximum variety differentiation.3
We will normalize t to 1. This amounts to a monotonic transformation of preferences. The
utilities of a consumer of type (x, y) from buying firm A’s and firm B’s standard products are
v − x− pA (1)
and
v + qy − (1− x)− pB, (2)
respectively.
3The assumption that qA = 0 is just a normalization. What matters is the quality difference, which here is
represented by q.
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Investing K ≥ 0 into product-customization technology allows a firm to produce a product that
exactly matches a given consumer’s preferred variety. The utilities of type (x, y) from buying firm
A’s and firm B’s customized products are
v − pA (3)
and
v + qy − pB, (4)
respectively.
The game involves two stages. In stage 1, the firms simultaneously decide whether to customize
their products. These decisions become common knowledge after they are made. In stage 2, the
firms simultaneously choose prices, consumers decide which products to purchase, and profits are
realized. The equilibrium concept employed is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The analysis of
consumer choices is straightforward. We, therefore, focus on the firms’ choices and proceed using
backward induction.
3 Analysis of the Pricing Stage
In this section we investigate the firms’ pricing decisions, taking as given their customization choices
in the first stage of the game. There are four subgames to consider, corresponding to the following
stage 1 scenarios: no firm customizes; firm A (the low quality firm) customizes; firm B (the high
quality firm) customizes; and both firms customize. We denote these subgames by “NN”, “YN”,
“NY”, and “YY”.
3.1 Subgame NN: No Firm Customizes
When no firm customizes, utilities from firm A’s and firm B’s standard products are given by (1)
and (2), respectively. Hence, a consumer of type (x, y) purchases from firm A if and only if
v − x− pA ≥ v + qy − (1− x)− pB.
Therefore, for a given level of quality valuation y, the marginal consumer type in terms of variety x
is given by
x̂(y) =
1
2
(1− qy + pB − pA) . (5)
It follows that the set of consumers who are indifferent between purchasing from firm A and firm B
corresponds to a straight line in the unit square. We will refer to this set as the indifference line.
This line divides the unit square into two areas representing firm A’s and firm B’s customers.
The slope of the indifference line (5) equals −2/q. An increase in q makes the line flatter. An
increase in pB (and/or decrease in pA) shifts the line to the right, thereby reducing the market size
of firm B. It follows that there are four possible positions for the indifference line. In Figure 1(a)
the line intersects the top and bottom sides of the square, in 1(b) the left and bottom sides, in 1(c)
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Figure 1: Indifference line and market areas
the left and right sides, and in 1(d) the top and right sides. Market areas served by firms A and B
are labeled A and B, respectively.
Let DA(pA, pB) and DB(pA, pB) denote the demand functions of firms A and B. The expressions
for these functions depend on the position of the indifference line. (The details are provided in the
proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix.) Because the firms’ marginal production costs are normalized
to zero, their profit functions are
ΠA(pA, pB) = DA(pA, pB)pA
and
ΠB(pA, pB) = DB(pA, pB)pB.
Firms A and B choose their prices pA and pB simultaneously to maximize ΠA(pA, pB) and ΠB(pA, pB),
respectively.
The following lemma presents the equilibrium for subgame NN.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium prices and profits when no firm customizes). Suppose neither firm cus-
tomizes in stage 1, then the equilibrium prices and profits in stage 2 are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 3/2, {
pNNA = 1− 16q
pNNB = 1 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠNNA =
1
2
(
1− 16q
)2
ΠNNB =
1
2
(
1 + 16q
)2
(ii) If 3/2 < q ≤ 3,
{
pNNA =
1
8
(
1 +
√
1 + 16q
)
pNNB =
1
8
(−5 + 3√1 + 16q) and

ΠNNA =
1
q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)3
ΠNNB =
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
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(iii) If q > 3, {
pNNA =
1
3q
pNNB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠNNA =
1
9q
ΠNNB =
4
9q
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It is easy to verify that the corresponding prices and profits in parts (i) and (ii) are equal when
evaluated at q = 3/2. Similarly, the prices and profits in parts (ii) and (iii) are equal at q = 3.
Therefore, the equilibrium prices and profits vary continuously when q changes. This is also true
for the other three subgames, i.e., in Lemmas 2 – 4.
Lemma 1 deserves some discussion. Case (i) corresponds to Figure 1(a) in which quality difference
q is small. In equilibrium, both firms serve consumers with all quality valuations, and each firm
attracts consumers closer to its position on the variety interval. Case (ii) corresponds to Figure 1(b).
Firm A attracts only consumers who are close to its variety position and have low quality valuations
(i.e., small x’s and small y’s). Firm B uses its quality advantage to capture all the other consumers.
Case (iii) corresponds to Figure 1(c) in which quality difference q is large. In this case, the low
quality firm A competes aggressively and the high quality firm B does better setting a high price
and exploiting consumers with high quality valuations. In equilibrium, firm A serves consumers of
all variety preferences, and so does firm B. Firm A attracts consumers with low quality valuations
and firm B attracts consumers with high quality valuations.
It is worthwhile to note the intuitive outcome implied by Lemma 1 that firm B sets a higher price,
serves a larger market area, and earns a higher profit than firm A in the equilibrium of subgame
NN. Furthermore, Figure 1(d) does not arise in equilibrium. This is also true for the other three
subgames studied next.
3.2 Subgame YN: Firm A Customizes
When only firm A customizes, utilities from firm A’s customized product and firm B’s standard
product are given by (3) and (2). Hence, a consumer of type (x, y) purchases from firm A if and
only if
v − pA ≥ v + qy − (1− x)− pB.
For a given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is given by
x̂(y) = 1− qy + pB − pA, (6)
from which we can calculate the demand and profit functions for the firms.
The following lemma presents the equilibrium for subgame YN.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium prices and profits when firm A customizes). Suppose firm A customizes in
stage 1, then the equilibrium prices and profits in stage 2 are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 1, {
pY NA =
2
3 − 16q
pY NB =
1
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠY NA =
(
2
3 − 16q
)2
ΠY NB =
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
(ii) If q > 1, {
pY NA =
1
3q +
1
6
pY NB =
2
3q − 16
and
{
ΠY NA =
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2
ΠY NB =
1
q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
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Note that the critical values for the cases in this lemma are different from those in Lemma 1,
and that the equilibrium of subgame YN involves only two possible positions of the indifference line.
This is due to the fact that the slope of the indifference line (6) is −1/q, which is different from that
of (5).
Case (i) of Lemma 2 corresponds to Figure 1(a) in which quality difference q is small. Cus-
tomization enables firm A to overcome its quality disadvantage. Firm A’s equilibrium price, market
size, and profit are higher than those of firm B. In equilibrium, both firms serve consumers with all
quality valuations, and each firm attracts consumers closer to its position on the variety interval.
To explain why firm B still attracts consumers with low quality valuations, it suffices to consider
consumers with y = 0. Such consumers do not gain any extra utility buying from the high quality
firm, yet some of them are attracted by firm B because of its low price.
Case (ii) corresponds to Figure 1(c) in which quality difference q is large. In this case, customiza-
tion does not overcome the quality disadvantage of firm A. In equilibrium, firm A’s price, market
size, and profit are lower than those of firm B. Firm A serves consumers of all variety preferences
and so does firm B. Firm A attracts consumers with low quality valuations and firm B attracts
consumers with high quality valuations. These results are similar to case (iii) of subgame NN.
3.3 Subgame NY: Firm B Customizes
When only firm B customizes, utilities from firm A’s standard product and firm B’s customized
product are given by (1) and (4). Hence, a consumer of type (x, y) purchases from firm A if and
only if
v − x− pA ≥ v + qy − pB.
For a given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is given by
x̂(y) = −qy + pB − pA. (7)
The following lemma presents the equilibrium for subgame NY.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium prices and profits when firm B customizes). Suppose firm B customizes in
stage 1, then the equilibrium prices and profits in stage 2 are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 1/2, {
pNYA =
1
3 − 16q
pNYB =
2
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠNYA =
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
ΠNYB =
(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2
(ii) If 1/2 < q ≤ 2, {
pNYA =
1
4
√
2q
pNYB =
3
4
√
2q
and
{
ΠNYA =
1
16
√
2q
ΠNYB =
9
16
√
2q
(iii) If q > 2, {
pNYA =
1
3q − 16
pNYB =
2
3q +
1
6
and
{
ΠNYA =
1
q
(
1
3q − 16
)2
ΠNYB =
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2
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This subgame leads to qualitatively similar results as subgame NN. Here, firm B’s quality ad-
vantage is reinforced by customization, pushing the critical values lower compared to subgame NN.
3.4 Subgame YY: Both Firms Customize
When both firms customize, utilities from firm A’s and and firm B’s customized products are given
by (3) and (4). Hence, a consumer of type (x, y) purchases from firm A if and only if
v − pA ≥ v + qy − pB,
or equivalently,
y ≤ pB − pA
q
.
The following lemma presents the equilibrium for subgame YY.
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium prices and profits when both firms customize). Suppose both firms customize
in stage 1, then the equilibrium prices and profits in stage 2 are given by:{
pY YA =
1
3q
pY YB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠY YA =
1
9q
ΠY YB =
4
9q
In the equilibrium of subgame YY the indifference line is horizontal at 1/3 from the bottom side
of the unit square. That is, firm A serves all consumers with quality valuations less than 1/3, and
firm B serves the rest. The result here is the same as in the standard vertical differentiation model.
4 Equilibrium Customization Choices
In stage 1 of the game the firms simultaneously decide whether to customize their products. This
is presented by the following matrix game, where “N” stands for no customization and “Y” stands
for customization.
Firm B
Firm A
N Y
N ΠNNA ,Π
NN
B Π
NY
A ,Π
NY
B −K
Y ΠY NA −K,ΠY NB ΠY YA −K,ΠY YB −K
Recall that K is the fixed cost of customization for each firm. Denote firm A’s change in gross
profit in the two columns by
c1 = ΠY NA −ΠNNA , c2 = ΠY YA −ΠNYA .
They represent firm A’s gains in profit from customization given B’s customization choice. Denote
firm B’s change in gross profit in the two rows by
r1 = ΠNYB −ΠNNB , r2 = ΠY YB −ΠY NB .
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They represent firm B’s gains in profit from customization given A’s customization choice.4 Hence,
(N,N) is a Nash equilibrium if K ≥ max {c1, r1}, (Y,N) is a Nash equilibrium if K ∈ [r2, c1], (N,Y)
is a Nash equilibrium if K ∈ [c2, r1], and (Y,Y) is a Nash equilibrium if K ≤ min {c2, r2}.
Lemma 5 (Relative gains from customization). For i, j = 1, 2, ci < rj.
That is, the high quality firm gains more from customization than the low quality firm. It follows
immediately that (Y,N) is not a Nash equilibrium for any value of K. Hence, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium except for K = c2 and K = r1. For ease of presentation without affecting the results,
we will select (Y,Y) as the Nash equilibrium at K = c2 and (N,Y) at K = r1. Accordingly,
(N,N)
(N,Y)
(Y,Y)
 is the Nash equilibrium iff

K > r1
K ∈ (c2, r1]
K ≤ c2
(8)
Because K is non-negative, the above discussion implies that the signs of c2 and r1 are crucial for
equilibrium analysis. Specifically, when both c2 and r1 are negative (N,N) is the Nash equilibrium
for any K. When c2 < 0 and r1 > 0, either (N,Y) or (N,N) is the Nash equilibrium, depending on
K. When both c2 and r1 are positive, the Nash equilibrium can be (Y,Y), (N,Y), or (N,N).
The next proposition summarizes our main results on customization choices.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium customization choices). The following holds for the firms’ equilibrium
customization choices in stage 1.
(i) If q ≤ 0.56 then the Nash equilibrium is (N,N) for any value of K.
(ii) If 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63 then the Nash equilibrium is (N,Y) for K ≤ r1, and (N,N) for K > r1.
(iii) If q > 0.63 then the Nash equilibrium is (Y,Y) for K ≤ c2, (N,Y) for K ∈ (c2, r1], and (N,N)
for K > r1.
Detailed expressions for the critical values of K (i.e., c2 and r1) are provided in the proof of
Proposition 1. Figure 2 plots c2 and r1 as functions of q.5 Depending on the values for parameters
q and K, either both firms customize, only the high quality firm customizes, or no firm customizes.
Moreover, the appearance of this sequence of outcomes is monotone in the fixed cost of customization.
Specifically, starting at the equilibrium when K = 0 we always move down the sequence (Y,Y)–
(N,Y)–(N,N) as K increases. Proposition 1 also implies that even if customization is costless, the
firms might not customize in equilibrium. This happens when the quality difference q is small
(≤ 0.56).
It is worth noting that whereas c2 is an increasing function of q, r1 is not. As a result, for fixed
K, the equilibrium does not follow a certain sequence as q changes. This can be seen from Figure 2.
4These gains are dependent on q and can be negative for both firms.
5The number 0.56 is an approximate solution to 81
√
2q = 2(6 + q)2. The number 0.63 is an approximate value of
81/126.
10
Kq
r1
c2
(N,N)
(N,Y)
(Y,Y)
0.56
0.63
Figure 2: Equilibrium customization choices
For example, as q increases, the equilibrium changes from (N,N) to (N,Y) to (Y,Y) for small values
of K, and from (N,N) to (N,Y) to (N,N) to (N,Y) for a range of values of K.
To highlight the effect of q on the equilibrium customization choices, considerK = 0. Customiza-
tion by one or both firms makes the rivals “closer” to each other, thus intensifying price competition.
The smaller is the quality difference, the tougher is price competition. In the extreme (hypothetical)
case in which q = 0 and both firms customize, price competition results in the Bertrand outcome.
This intuition is behind the findings of Proposition 1. When q is small, the firms do not customize
their products in order to avoid a price war. When q is large, the firms customize to take advantage
of consumers’ desires for ideal varieties. The intermediate case involves customization by one of the
firms (firm B).
We next explore how total welfare, defined as the sum of consumer and producer surpluses,
changes with the fixed cost of customization. Surprisingly, we find that total welfare is not always
monotonically decreasing in K (Proposition 2). Because prices are transfers between consumers and
firms, total welfare in our model is v plus utility from purchasing the high quality product, minus
disutility from consuming a less preferred variety, minus customization costs. That is,
W = v + q
∫
B
∫
y dxdy − (1− 1IA)
∫
A
∫
xdxdy − (1− 1IB)
∫
B
∫
(1− x) dxdy −K(1IA + 1IB). (9)
In (9), 1IA and 1IB are indicator functions; 1IA = 1 if firm A customizes and zero otherwise, similar for
1IB. The second term is the benefit accrued to consumers who buy from firm B. The third (fourth)
term measures the disutility of firm A’s (B’s) consumers from not getting their most preferred
varieties. The last term is the sum of the firms’ customization costs.
Proposition 2 (Welfare effects of K). The following holds for total welfare as a function of K.
(i) For q ≤ 1.53, total welfare monotonically decreases in K.
(ii) For q > 1.53, total welfare is non-monotonic in K. Specifically, it decreases up to some critical
value of K at which it jumps up and then continues to decrease.
11
WKr1
W
Kc2 r1
W
Kc2 r1
(a) 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63 (b) 0.63 < q ≤ 1.53 (c) q > 1.53
Figure 3: Total welfare
We first provide graphic illustrations for this proposition and then the intuition. By Proposition
1, if q ≤ 0.56 then the firms do not customize in equilibrium for any value of K. Hence, W is
independent of K. If 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63 then firm B customizes for small values of K and neither firm
customizes for large values of K. Total welfare is a monotone function in K, as depicted in Figure
3(a).6 If q > 0.63 then the equilibrium switches from (Y,Y) to (N,Y), and then to (N,N) as K
increases. In this case there are two patterns for W , monotonic in Figure 3(b) and non-monotonic
in Figure 3(c).7
The intuition behind these results, the non-monotonicity result in particular, can be obtained
by examining how the individual terms in total welfare change with K. For convenience, let W Y Y ,
WNY , and WNN denote total welfare under the three possible equilibria. By (9),
W Y Y = v + q
∫
B
∫
y dxdy − 2K, (10)
WNY = v + q
∫
B
∫
y dxdy −
∫
A
∫
xdxdy −K, (11)
and
WNN = v + q
∫
B
∫
y dxdy −
∫
A
∫
xdxdy −
∫
B
∫
(1− x) dxdy. (12)
Note that market areas A and B are generally different in these expressions for a given q. Consider
first what happens at K = c2, where the equilibrium switches from (Y,Y) to (N,Y). According to
(10) and (11), total welfare increases by K and decreases by
∫∫
A xdxdy. Also, q
∫∫
B ydxdy increases
because firm B attracts more consumers when firm A stops customizing. This effect is stronger for
higher values of q. When q is small, the two positive effects are not large enough to overwhelm the
negative effect. As a result, W jumps down at K = c2 as illustrated in Figure 3(b). When q is high,
6The first segment has the slope of −1 and the second segment is horizontal.
7In both cases, the first segment has the slope of −2, the second has the slope of −1, and the third is horizontal.
The number 1.53 is an approximate value of 49/32.
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the two positive effects overcome the negative effect, and W jumps up at K = c2 as in Figure 3(c).
Consider next what happens at K = r1, where the equilibrium switches from (N,Y) to (N,N).
From (11) and (12), total welfare increases by K and decreases by
∫∫
B(1 − x)dxdy. Moreover, the
term q
∫∫
B ydxdy decreases because firm B stops customizing and loses some consumers to firm A.
The two negative effects are stronger than the positive effect, leading to the downward jumps of W
in both Figures 3(b) and 3(c). Similar reasoning applies to Figure 3(a).
5 Customization vs. No Customization
In this section we contrast the customization model studied above with the benchmark model in
which customization is not feasible. This allows us to investigate how customization affects con-
sumers, firms, and total welfare. Obviously, the benchmark model corresponds to subgame NN,
hence the prices and profits are as in Lemma 1.
Proposition 3 is concerned with consumer surplus, which is equal to the first four terms in (9)
minus the payments by all consumers.
Proposition 3 (Effect of customization on consumer surplus). Customization increases consumer
surplus.
Customization enables some or all consumers to get their most preferred varieties, it also increases
competition between the firms. Both factors work to improve consumer welfare. Obviously, if both
firms choose not to customize in the customization model then the two models yield the same
outcome.
Whereas the effect of customization on consumer surplus is unambiguous, it is not so with respect
to the firms’ profits net of customization costs.
Proposition 4 (Effect of customization on net profits). Compared to the benchmark,
(i) firm A is worse off and firm B is better off whenever (N,Y) is the equilibrium in stage 1;
(ii) both firms are worse off whenever (Y,Y) is the equilibrium in stage 1.
It is obvious that firm B is better off when it is the only firm customizing in equilibrium. In this
case firm A is hurt by more fierce competition. When q and K are such that both firms customize in
equilibrium, the stage 1 game is a prisoners’ dilemma game. Customization is the dominant choice
for each firm, but intensified price competition destroys the advantages of customization.
The next proposition concerns total welfare.
Proposition 5 (Effect of customization on total welfare). Customization improves total welfare.
To summarize, customization always benefits consumers but may hurt the firms. However, the
gain by consumers always outweighs possible losses of the firms.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The novelty of our paper is the incorporation of difference in product qualities into customization
competition. Customization enables firms to take advantage of consumers’ desires for ideal vari-
eties. However, it makes firms less differentiated and, therefore, intensifies price competition. This
intuition is behind much of the results in the theoretical literature on customization, and is shown
here to be valid when there is vertical differentiation.
The most important finding in our paper is that quality does play an important role in firms’
strategic decisions concerning customization. We show that customization can occur in equilibrium
only when the quality difference is sufficiently large. Moreover, the high quality firm can always
reap a larger benefit from customization than the low quality firm. As a result, the high quality
firm may be the only firm customizing in equilibrium, whereas the low quality firm never customizes
alone. This result is supported by many real-world observations. We do not see customized low
quality bicycles and shoes. As another example, Timbuk 2 customizes its messenger bags, whereas
lower quality bags made by many other manufactures are not customized.
Both consumer surplus and total welfare are shown to be higher under customization, but the
firms often find themselves playing a prisoners’ dilemma game and end up worse off. These results
are largely consistent with findings in the literature. A new and interesting result in our paper is
that total welfare is not always monotonically decreasing in the fixed cost of customization.
Our paper has focused on the strategic aspect of customization. One extension is to make the
range of customization a continuous choice variable. Such a model would involve a fairly complex
analysis. We believe that the qualitative results of our paper will hold; e.g., the range of customiza-
tion of the higher quality firm is larger than that of the lower quality firm. Another interesting
extension is to introduce dynamics into the model to address the roles of customization and quality
in entry deterrence.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 3/2. Suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the top and bottom sides of the
unit square as shown in Figure 1(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
q + pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
q + pA − pB
)
in this case. The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
1− 12q + pB − 2pA = 0
1 + 12q + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pNNA = 1− 16q
pNNB = 1 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠNNA =
1
2
(
1− 16q
)2
ΠNNB =
1
2
(
1 + 16q
)2
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom
sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− q + pNNB − pNNA
)
=
1
2
(
1− 2
3
q
)
≥ 0,
x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 + pNNB − pNNA
)
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
q
)
< 1
hold for q ≤ 3/2. (In fact, x̂(1) = 0 when q = 3/2.)
(ii) Consider 3/2 < q ≤ 3. Suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the left and bottom sides of
the unit square as shown in Figure 1(b). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
4q
(1 + pB − pA)2 and DB(pA, pB) = 1− 14q (1 + pB − pA)
2
in this case. The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
(1 + pB − pA)(1 + pB − 3pA) = 0
(1 + pB − pA)(1 + 3pB − pA) = 4q
imply
{
pNNA =
1
8(1 +
√
1 + 16q)
pNNB =
1
8(−5 + 3
√
1 + 16q)
and

ΠNNA =
1
q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)3
ΠNNB =
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the left and bottom
sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− q + 1
4
(
−3 +
√
1 + 16q
))
< 0,
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x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
4
(
−3 +
√
1 + 16q
))
∈ (0, 1]
hold for 3/2 < q ≤ 3. (In fact, x̂(1) = 0 when q = 3/2 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 3.)
(iii) Consider q > 3. Suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the left and right sides of the unit
square as shown in Figure 1(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(pB − pA) and DB(pA, pB) = 1
q
(q + pA − pB) .
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
pB − 2pA = 0
q + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pNNA =
1
3q
pNNB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠNNA =
1
9q
ΠNNB =
4
9q
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides
of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− 2
3
q
)
< 0 and x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
q
)
> 1
hold for q > 3. (In fact, x̂(0) = 1 when q = 3.)
Proof of Lemma 2. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 1. Suppose the indifference line (6) intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit
square as shown in Figure 1(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) = 1− 12q + pB − pA and DB(pA, pB) =
1
2
q + pA − pB.
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
1− 12q + pB − 2pA = 0
1
2q + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pY NA =
2
3 − 16q
pY NB =
1
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠY NA =
(
2
3 − 16q
)2
ΠY NB =
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom
sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) = 1− q + pY NB − pY NA =
2
3
− 2
3
q ≥ 0 and x̂(0) = 1 + pY NB − pY NA =
2
3
+
1
3
q < 1
hold for q ≤ 1. (In fact, x̂(1) = 0 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 1.)
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(ii) Consider q > 1. Suppose the indifference line (6) intersects the left and right sides of the unit
square as shown in Figure 1(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
1
2
+ pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
q − 1
2
+ pA − pB
)
.
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
1
2 + pB − 2pA = 0
q − 12 + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pY NA =
1
3q +
1
6
pY NB =
2
3q − 16
and
{
ΠY NA =
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2
ΠY NB =
1
q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides
of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
2
3
− 2
3
q < 0 and x̂(0) =
2
3
+
1
3
q > 1
hold for q > 1. (In fact, x̂(1) = 0 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 1.)
Proof of Lemma 3. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 1/2. Suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the top and bottom sides of the
unit square as shown in Figure 1(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) = −12q + pB − pA and DB(pA, pB) = 1 +
1
2
q + pA − pB.
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{ −12q + pB − 2pA = 0
1 + 12q + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pNYA =
1
3 − 16q
pNYB =
2
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠNYA =
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
ΠNYB =
(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom
sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) = −q + pNYB − pNYA =
1
3
− 2
3
q ≥ 0 and x̂(0) = pNYB − pNYA =
1
3
+
1
3
q < 1
hold for q ≤ 1/2. (In fact, x̂(1) = 0 when q = 1/2.)
(ii) Consider 1/2 < q ≤ 2. Suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the left and bottom sides of
the unit square as shown in Figure 1(b). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
2q
(pB − pA)2 and DB(pA, pB) = 1− 12q (pB − pA)
2 .
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The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
(pB − pA)(pB − 3pA) = 0
(pB − pA)(3pB − pA) = 2q
imply {
pNYA =
1
4
√
2q
pNYB =
3
4
√
2q
and
{
ΠNYA =
1
16
√
2q
ΠNYB =
9
16
√
2q
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the left and bottom
sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
x̂(1) = −q + 1
2
√
2q < 0 and x̂(0) =
1
2
√
2q ∈ (0, 1]
hold for 1/2 < q ≤ 2. (In fact, x̂(1) = 0 when q = 1/2 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 2.)
(iii) Consider q > 2. Suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the left and right sides of the unit
square as shown in Figure 1(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
−1
2
+ pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
q +
1
2
+ pA − pB
)
.
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{ −12 + pB − 2pA = 0
q + 12 + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pNYA =
1
3q − 16
pNYB =
2
3q +
1
6
and
{
ΠNYA =
1
q
(
1
3q − 16
)2
ΠNYB =
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2
It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides
of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
3
− 2
3
q < 0 and x̂(0) =
1
3
+
1
3
q > 1
hold for q > 2. (In fact, x̂(0) = 1 when q = 2.)
Proof of Lemma 4. The firms’ profit functions are
ΠA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(pB − pA) pA and ΠB(pA, pB) = 1
q
(q + pA − pB) pB.
The first-order conditions {
pB − 2pA = 0
q + pA − 2pB = 0
imply {
pY YA =
1
3q
pY YB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠY YA =
1
9q
ΠY YB =
4
9q
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Proof of Lemma 5. Lemmas 1 – 4 imply that there are six regions of q to consider. Lemma 5 follows
immediately from the following.
(1) Consider q ≤ 1/2. By Lemmas 1(i), 2(i), 3(i), and 4,
c1 =
(
2
3 − 16q
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2
c2 = 19q −
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
r1 =
(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2 − 12 (1 + 16q)2
r2 = 49q −
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
It is straightforward to show that if q ≤ 0.34 then c1 < c2 < r1 < r2 ≤ 0, and if 0.34 < q ≤ 1/2
then c1 < c2 < r1 < 0 < r2.
(2) Consider 1/2 < q ≤ 1. By Lemmas 1(i), 2(i), 3(ii), and 4,
c1 =
(
2
3 − 16q
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2
c2 = 19q − 116
√
2q
r1 = 916
√
2q − 12
(
1 + 16q
)2
r2 = 49q −
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
Simple algebra implies that if 1/2 < q ≤ 0.56 then c1 < c2 < r1 ≤ 0 < r2, if 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63
then c1 < c2 ≤ 0 < r1 < r2, and if 0.63 < q ≤ 1 then c1 < 0 < c2 < r1 < r2.
(3) Consider 1 < q ≤ 3/2. By Lemmas 1(i), 2(ii), 3(ii), and 4,
c1 = 1q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2
c2 = 19q − 116
√
2q
r1 = 916
√
2q − 12
(
1 + 16q
)2
r2 = 49q − 1q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
Simple algebra implies that if 1 < q ≤ 1.43 then c1 ≤ 0 < c2 < r1 < r2, and if 1.43 < q ≤ 3/2
then 0 < c1 < c2 < r1 < r2.
(4) Consider 3/2 < q ≤ 2. By Lemmas 1(ii), 2(ii), 3(ii), and 4,
c1 = 1q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 1q (1+√1+16q8 )3
c2 = 19q − 116
√
2q
r1 = 916
√
2q −
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8
r2 = 49q − 1q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
It is straightforward to show that 0 < c1 < c2 < r1 < r2.
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(5) Consider 2 < q ≤ 3. By Lemmas 1(ii), 2(ii), 3(iii), and 4,
c1 = 1q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 1q (1+√1+16q8 )3
c2 = 19q − 1q
(
1
3q − 16
)2 = 19 − 136q
r1 = 1q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − (1− 1q (1+√1+16q8 )2) −5+3√1+16q8
r2 = 49q − 1q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
Simple algebra implies that if 2 < q ≤ 2.74 then 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < r1 < r2, if 2.74 < q ≤ 2.84
then 0 < c2 < c1 < r1 ≤ r2, and if 2.84 < q ≤ 3 then 0 < c2 < c1 < r2 < r1.
(6) Consider q > 3. By Lemmas 1(iii), 2(ii), 3(iii), and 4,
c1 = 1q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 19q
c2 = 19q − 1q
(
1
3q − 16
)2 = 19 − 136q
r1 = 1q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − 49q = 29 + 136q
r2 = 49q − 1q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
It is straightforward to show that 0 < c2 < c1 < r2 < r1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Applying the proof of Lemma 5 to (8) leads to the three conclusions in this
proposition.
(i) If q ≤ 0.56, both c2 and r1 are negative. Hence, (N,N) is the Nash equilibrium for any value of
K.
(ii) If 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63, c2 ≤ 0 < r1. Hence, (N,Y) is the Nash equilibrium when
K ≤ r1 = 916
√
2q − 1
2
(
1 +
1
6
q
)2
,
and (N,N) is the Nash equilibrium when K > r1.
(iii) If q > 0.63, both c2 and r1 are positive. Hence, (Y,Y) is the Nash equilibrium when K ≤ c2,
(N,Y) is the Nash equilibrium when K ∈ (c2, r1], and (Y,Y) is the Nash equilibrium when
K > r1. Here,
c2 =
{ 1
9q − 116
√
2q, if 0.63 < q ≤ 2
1
9 − 136q , if q > 2
and
r1 =

9
16
√
2q − 12
(
1 + 16q
)2
, if 0.56 < q ≤ 3/2
9
16
√
2q −
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8 , if 3/2 < q ≤ 2
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − (1− 1q (1+√1+16q8 )2) −5+3√1+16q8 , if 2 < q ≤ 3
2
9 +
1
36q , if q > 3
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Proof of Proposition 2. Lemmas 1 – 4 together with Proposition 1 imply that there are six regions
of q to consider. The two results in Proposition 2 follow immediately.
(1) Consider q ≤ 0.56. By Proposition 1, the firms do not customize in equilibrium for any value
of K. Hence, W is independent of K.
(2) Consider 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63. When K ≤ r1, only firm B customizes, the prices are as in Lemma
3(ii), and the indifference line intersects the left and bottom sides of the unit square (Figure
1b). Hence,
WNY = v + q
1∫
1√
2q
1∫
0
y dxdy + q
1
2
√
2q∫
0
1∫
bx(y)
y dxdy −
1√
2q∫
0
bx(y)∫
0
xdxdy −K = v + 1
2
q − 1
12
√
2q −K,
where
x̂(y) = −qy + 1
2
√
2q.
When K > r1, neither firm customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 1(i), and the indifference
line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square (Figure 1a). Hence,
WNN = v + q
1∫
0
1∫
bx(y)
y dxdy −
1∫
0
bx(y)∫
0
xdxdy −
1∫
0
1∫
bx(y)
(1− x) dxdy = v + 1
4
q +
1
18
q2 − 1
4
,
where
x̂(y) =
1
2
(
1− qy + 1
3
q
)
.
Evaluating WNY and WNN at r1 yields WNY > WNN . Hence, W decreases in K until r1,
jumps down at r1, and then stays constant (Figure 3a).
(3) Consider 0.63 < q ≤ 3/2. When K ≤ c2, both firms customize, and the prices are as in Lemma
4. Hence,
W Y Y = v + q
1∫
1
3
1∫
0
y dxdy − 2K = v + 4
9
q − 2K.
When K ∈ (c2, r1], only firm B customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 3(ii), and
WNY = v +
1
2
q − 1
12
√
2q −K.
Finally, when K > r1, neither firm customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 1(i), and
WNN = v +
1
4
q +
1
18
q2 − 1
4
.
Evaluating W Y Y and WNY at c2 yields W Y Y > WNY . Evaluating WNY and WNN at r1
yields WNY > WNN . Hence, W decreases in K until c2, jumps down at c2, continues to
decrease until r1, jumps down at r1, and then stays constant (Figure 3b).
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(4) Consider 3/2 < q ≤ 2. When K ≤ c2, both firms customize, and
W Y Y = v +
4
9
q − 2K.
When K ∈ (c2, r1], only firm B customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 3(ii), and
WNY = v +
1
2
q − 1
12
√
2q −K.
Finally, when K > r1, neither firm customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 1(ii), and the
indifference line intersects the left and bottom sides of the unit square (Figure 1b). Hence,
WNN = v + q
1∫
∆
q
1∫
0
y dxdy + q
∆
q∫
0
1∫
bx(y)
y dxdy −
∆
q∫
0
bx(y)∫
0
xdxdy
−
1∫
∆
q
1∫
0
(1− x) dxdy −
∆
q∫
0
1∫
bx(y)
(1− x) dxdy = v + 1
2
q +
1
4q
∆2 − 1
6q
∆3 − 1
2
,
where
x̂(y) =
1
2
(∆− qy) and ∆ = 1
4
(
1 +
√
1 + 16q
)
.
EvaluatingW Y Y andWNY at c2 yieldsW Y Y < WNY if q > 1.53. EvaluatingWNY andWNN
at r1 yields WNY > WNN . That is, W is non-monotonic in K for 1.53 < q ≤ 2. Specifically,
it decreases until c2, jumps up at c2, decreases until r1, jumps down at r1, and then stays
constant (Figure 3c).
(5) Consider 2 < q ≤ 3. When K ≤ c2, both firms customize, and
W Y Y = v +
4
9
q − 2K.
When K ∈ (c2, r1], only firm B customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 3(iii), and the indif-
ference line intersects the left and right sides of the unit square (Figure 1c). Hence,
WNY = v + q
1∫
0
1∫
by(x)
y dydx−
1∫
0
by(x)∫
0
xdydx−K = v + 4
9
q +
1
9q
− 1
9
−K,
where
ŷ(x) =
1
q
(
−x+ 1
3
q +
1
3
)
.
Finally, when K > r1, neither firm customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 1(ii), and
WNN = v +
1
2
q +
1
4q
∆2 − 1
6q
∆3 − 1
2
.
Evaluating W Y Y and WNY at c2 yields W Y Y < WNY . Evaluating WNY and WNN at r1
yields WNY > WNN . Hence, W decreases until c2, jumps up at c2, decreases until r1, jumps
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down at r1, and then stays constant (Figure 3c).
(6) Consider q > 3. When K ≤ c2, both firms customize, and
W Y Y = v +
4
9
q − 2K.
When K ∈ (c2, r1], only firm B customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 3(iii), and
WNY = v +
4
9
q +
1
9q
− 1
9
−K.
Finally, when K > r1, neither firm customizes, the prices are as in Lemma 1(iii), and the
indifference line intersects the left and right sides of the unit square (Figure 1c). Hence,
WNN = v + q
1∫
0
1∫
by(x)
y dydx−
1∫
0
by(x)∫
0
xdydx−
1∫
0
1∫
by(x)
(1− x) dydx = v + 4
9
q +
1
6q
− 1
2
,
where
ŷ(x) =
1
q
(
1− 2x+ 1
3
q
)
.
Evaluating W Y Y and WNY at c2 yields W Y Y < WNY . Evaluating WNY and WNN at r1
yields WNY > WNN . Hence, W decreases until c2, jumps up at c2, decreases until r1, jumps
down at r1, and then stays constant (Figure 3c).
Proof of Proposition 3. Subtracting the firms’ equilibrium profits ΠNNA and Π
NN
B from W
NN calcu-
lated in the proof of Proposition 2 yields consumer surplus under the benchmark model,
CS =

v + 14q +
1
36q
2 − 54 , if q ≤ 3/2
v + 12q − 38
(
1 +
√
1 + 16q
)
+ 23q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)3
+ 12 , if 3/2 < q ≤ 3
v − 19q + 16q − 12 , if q > 3
Let CS denote consumer surplus in the model with customization. It can be obtained by removing
the last term in (9) and subtracting away profits ΠA and ΠB. By using the the detailed expressions
for W in the proof of Proposition 2 and the profit expressions in Lemmas 1, 3, and 4, we get
CS =

v − 19q, if q > 0.63 and K ≤ c2
v + 12q − 1724
√
2q, if 0.56 < q ≤ 0.63 and K ≤ r1
v + 12q − 1724
√
2q, if 0.56 < q ≤ 2 and K ∈ (c2, r1]
v − 19q + 118q − 29 , if q > 2 and K ∈ (c2, r1]
CS, otherwise
Straightforward algebra implies that CS ≥ CS holds for any values of q and K.
Proof of Proposition 4. Each part is proven in turn.
(i) It is obvious that, compared to the benchmark model, firm B is better off when (N,Y) is the
equilibrium in stage 1. In this case firm A does worse, because ΠNNA > Π
NY
A holds for q > 0.56.
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(ii) Both firms are worse off when (Y,Y) is the equilibrium in stage 1. Indeed, for q > 0.63 it is
straightforward to show that ΠNNA > Π
Y Y
A and Π
NN
B > Π
Y Y
B , implying Π
NN
A > Π
Y Y
A −K and
ΠNNB > Π
Y Y
B −K hold for any K ≤ c2.
Proof of Proposition 5. This result follows immediately from Proposition 2, Figure 3, and the easily
confirmed fact that in Figure 3(c) the horizontal portion is below both decreasing portions.
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